Hu, Huang and Fan proposed a fully secure hierarchical identity-based encryption (IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, Vol.E92-A, No.6, pp.1494-1499 , 2009 ) that achieves constant size of ciphertext and tight security reduction. Unfortunately, Park and Lee (IEICE Trans. Fundamentals, Vol. E93-A, No.6, pp.1269E93-A, No.6, pp. -1272E93-A, No.6, pp. , 2010 found that the security proof of Hu et al.'s scheme is incorrect; that is, the security of Hu et al.'s scheme cannot be reduced to their claimed q-ABDHE assumption. However, it is unclear whether Hu et al.'s scheme is still secure. In this letter, we provide an attack to show that the scheme is not secure against the chosen-plaintext attack.
Introduction
The notion of identity-based (ID-based) cryptography [1] was introduced by Shamir in 1984. The useful feature of IDbased cryptosystems is that an entity's public key can be determined from his identity such as an email address and the corresponding private key is generated by a private key generator (PKG). Using identities as public keys eliminates the need of public-key certificates used in the traditional public key infrastructure. ID-based cryptography is supposed to provide an alternative to conventional public key infrastructure from the viewpoint of efficiency and convenience. Shamir presented an ID-based signature scheme in his pioneer work [1] , but ID-based encryption (IBE) was not introduced. Later, Boneh and Franklin presented a practical IBE scheme [2] from bilinear pairings in 2002. Since then, ID-based encryption has become a hot research topic.
Although a single PKG was usually used in an IBE scheme, it is undesirable for a large network because the PKG might become a bottleneck. To reduce the workload of the PKG, hierarchical ID-based encryption (HIBE) [3] , Manuscript [4] , whose security was only proved in the ideal random oracle model. Secure HIBE schemes without random oracles were proposed Boneh, Boyen and Goh [5] , [6] . However, these schemes are proved secure only in the weak selective-ID model. In Eurocrypt 2005, Waters [7] described a method to extend his ID-based encryption to an efficient HIBE scheme which is secure in the standard model, but suffers a long public parameters. In Asiacrypt 2006, Chatterjee and Sarkar presented a HIBE scheme [8] that is secure without random oracles in the full model with short public parameters. However, the length of private keys and ciphertext, and the time required for encryption and decryption, grow linearly in the depth of the hierarchy in their scheme. An open problem in the construction of HIBE [8] is to avoid or control the security degradation which is exponential in the number of levels of the HIBE. Au, Liu and Yuen proposed a HIBE scheme which is secure in the full model without random oracles with a tight security reduction in their unpublished paper [9] . Unfortunately, Hu, Huang and Fan [10] showed that Au et al.'s scheme [9] is not secure and gave a new practical HIBE scheme. They claimed their scheme achieves two advantages over the previous ones. Firstly, it can be proven secure in the full model without random oracles with a tight security reduction. Secondly, the ciphertext consists of just four elements and decryption needs only two pairing computations, both of which are independent of the hierarchy depth. However, Park and Lee [11] pointed out that the security proof of Hu et al.'s scheme [10] is incorrect, that is, the security of Hu et al.'s scheme cannot be reduced to their claimed complexity assumption, q-ABDHE assumption. Now one may have the doubt that whether Hu et al.'s scheme is really secure or not. To our knowledge, no paper has addressed this issue. Therefore, in this letter, we aim to address the issue and get a negative answer. By giving a concrete attack, we indicate that Hu et al.'s scheme is not secure against chosen-plaintext attack.
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Review of Hu et al.'s HIBE Scheme
Let G be a cyclic additive group generated by g, whose order is a prime p, and G T be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. e : G × G → G T denotes a bilinear pairing with the following properties [2] : (1) Bilinearity: e(g a , g b ) = e(g, g) ab for all a, b ∈ Z p ; (2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 1 G T ; (3) Computability: e is efficiently computable.
In Hu et al.'s HIBE scheme [10] , the message space is G T , and the identity space is Z p . l is a positive integer which specifies the maximum level of the HIBE. The HIBE scheme due to Hu et al. consists of the following algorithms.
Setup:
The PKG randomly chooses generators g, g 0 ∈ G, and randomly picks g 2 ,
The public parameters are params = {r, g, g 0 , g 4 , g 5 , F(1), · · · , F(l)} and the master secret key is α, u. Extraction: Let ID = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID i ) ∈ Z i p , 1 ≤ i ≤ l, be the identity for which the private key is required. Choose r i randomly from Z * p , and define
d ID is the private key for the identity ID. Key delegation can be done as follows. Suppose (a 0 , a 1 , b i , · · · , b l ) is a private key for the identity (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID i−1 ).
To generate a private key (a 0 , a 1 , b i , · · · , b l ) for the identity (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID i−1 , ID i ), first pick a random t ∈ Z p and compute
It is obvious that (a 0 , a 1 , b i+1 , · · · , b l ) is a valid private key of the identity (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID i ) for r i = r i−1 + t. Encryption: Let ID = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID i ) be the identity under which a message m ∈ G T is to be encrypted. Choose a random elements s ∈ Z p and the ciphertext is
Decryption: Let CT = (A, B, C, D) be a ciphertext on the identity ID = (ID 1 , ID 2 , · · · , ID i ), and (a 0 , a 1 , b i+1 , · · · , b l ) be the corresponding private key, where 1 ≤ i ≤ l. The decryption steps are as follows.
Check whether A and B are elements of G T and C, D are in G. If any of the conditions does not hold, the ciphertext is invalid; Otherwise, compute the plaintext A · B r · e(C, a 0 ) e(a 1 , D) .
Analysis of Hu et al.'s HIBE Scheme
In this section, we analyze the security of Hu et al.'s HIBE scheme an give an attack to show that their scheme is not secure under their security model.
Security Model for HIBE
The chosen-ciphertext security for an HIBE scheme in the full model is defined by the game between an adversary A and a challenger C below.
Setup:
The challenger C runs the setup algorithm and forwards the system parameters param to adversary A, keeping the master secret key msk to himself. Phase 1: Adversary A adaptively performs a polynomially bounded number of queries, i.e. each query may depend on the answers to the previous queries.
Key extraction query:
On input an identity ID of depth i(1 ≤ i ≤ l), C generates the corresponding secret key for ID and returns it to A. Decryption query: On input a ciphertext C as well as an identity ID of depth i(1 ≤ i ≤ l), C decrypts the ciphertext using the private key of ID, and forwards the resulting plaintext to A.
Challenge:
Once adversary A decides that Phase 1 is over, he outputs a target identity ID * of depth i(1 ≤ i ≤ l) and two equal-length messages M 0 , M 1 . The only restriction is that, A did not previously issue a key extraction query for ID * or a prefix of ID * . The challenger C flips a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and computes the challenge ciphertext CT * = Encrypt(params, M b , ID * ) and send CT * to A. Phase 2: This is identical to Phase 1 except that A can not perform a key extraction query for ID * or a prefix of ID * , and A can not issue a decryption query for (ID * , CT * ). Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b ∈ {0, 1} of b and wins the game if b = b.
We say that a HIBE scheme is (t, , q e , q d )-CCA secure, if no t-time adversary has advantage at least in the game with making at most q e key extraction queries and q d decryption queries.
If we restrict the adversary from performing the decryption queries, then a HIBE is said to be (t, , q e )-CPA (chosen plaintext attack) secure. Some standard techniques for converting a CPA-secure HIBE into a CCA-secure HIBE have been given.
Cryptanalysis of Hu et al.'s HIBE Scheme
Hu, Huang and Fan claimed that their HIBE scheme [10] is IND-CPA secure in the standard model. However, we here demonstrate that their scheme can not reach their security goal. Specifically, there exists an adversary A who can break the IND-CPA security of their scheme below:
1. In Setup stage, the adversary A is given the parameter params. 2. In Phase 1, A does not perform any queries. 3. In Challenge phase, A outputs a target identity ID * = (ID * 1 , ID * 2 , · · · , ID * i−1 , ID * i ) and two equal-length plaintexts M 0 , M 1 . Then he is given the challenge ciphertext CT * = (A * , B * , C * , D * ). According to the encryption algorithm in Hu et al.'s HIBE scheme, CT * is of the following forms:
where b and s * are chosen randomly by the challenger.
A's task is to correctly guess the random bit b. 4. In Phase 2, A picks two identities
where ID i0 , ID i1 and ID * i are pairwise different and ID i0 + ID i1 2ID * i . Namely, ID * , ID0 and ID1 locate in the same level in the hierarchy and share the same prefixes (ID * 1 , ID * 2 , · · · , ID * i−1 ), but they represent different identities. Then, A computes a new identity ID2 as follows:
Because ID i0 , ID i1 and ID * i are pairwise different, and ID i0 + ID i1 2ID * i , we can conclude that none of the identities ID0, ID1, ID2 is the target identity ID * . Therefore, A can issue key extraction queries on ID0, ID1 and ID2 and get their secret keys respectively. According to Hu et al.'s HIBE scheme [10] , we know the secret keys of the identities at depth i are of the following forms. d ID0 = (a 0,0 , a 1,0 , b i+1,0 , · · · , b l,0 ) where
, a 1,2 = (g 4 ) r i , b i+1,2 = F(i + 1) r i , · · · , b l,2 = F(l) r i . Now, after obtaining d ID0 , d ID1 and d ID2 , A computes d ID0 ·d ID1 /d ID2 as a valid private key for the target identity ID * . This is true because a 0,0 · a 0,1 a 0,2 = (g 0 g −r ) 1/(α−u) ·
Obviously, this is a valid private key for the target identity ID * . Now A is able to decrypt the target ciphertext CT * with this private key to obtain the message M b , and can answer the correct b to the Challenger with probability 1.
Conclusion
In this letter, we analyzed the security of Hu, Huang and Fan's HIBE [10] and gave a concrete attack to show their scheme is not secure. Since the adversary in our attack did not issue any decryption queries, it means that Hu et al.'s HIBE scheme does not achieve the IND-CPA security.
